Classic decision-theory is based on the maximum expected utility (MEU) principle, but crucially ignores the resource costs incurred when determining optimal decisions. Here we propose an axiomatic framework for bounded decision-making that considers resource costs. Agents are formalized as probability measures over input-output streams. We postulate that any such probability measure can be assigned a corresponding conjugate utility function based on three axioms: utilities should be real-valued, additive and monotonic mappings of probabilities. We show that these axioms enforce a unique conversion law between utility and probability (and thereby, information). Moreover, we show that this relation can be characterized as a variational principle: given a utility function, its conjugate probability measure maximizes a free utility functional. Transformations of probability measures can then be formalized as a change in free utility due to the addition of new constraints expressed by a target utility function. Accordingly, one obtains a criterion to choose a probability measure that trades off the maximization of a target utility function and the cost of the deviation from a reference distribution. We show that optimal control, adaptive estimation and adaptive control problems can be solved this way in a resource-efficient way. When resource costs are ignored, the MEU principle is recovered. Our formalization might thus provide a principled approach to bounded rationality that establishes a close link to information theory.
Introduction
Rational decision-making is based on the principle of (subjective) maximum expected utility (MEU) (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954; Anscombe, F. J. and Aumann, R. J., 1963) . According to the MEU principle, a rational agent chooses its action a so as to maximize its expected utility
Pr(s|a)U(s)
given the probability Pr(s|a) that action a ∈ A will lead to outcome s ∈ S and given that the desirability of the outcome s is measured by the utility U(s) ∈ R. Thus, expected utilities express betting preferences over lotteries with uncertain outcomes. The optimal action a * ∈ A is defined as the one that maximizes the expected utility, that is a * := arg max
What is not apparent from this simple formula, however, is that finding the optimal action can be very difficult, especially for decision-making problems in uncertain environments with very large space of outcomes S. One could easily imagine that computing the optimal answer is so costly (in terms of computational resources), that one would rather content oneself with a slightly "sub-optimal" solution that incurs into less resource costs. The problem is, however, that the MEU principle as stated above does not formally consider resource costs, and hence the problem of limited resources is ignored. Attempts to take resource costs into account for efficient decision-making have led to the important concept of (resource-)bounded rationality (Simon, 1982) . In this paper we propose an axiomatic formalization of bounded rationality that interprets a decision-maker's behavior (characterized by a probability measure) as an implicit manifestation of his preferences. We postulate three axioms that lead to a quantitative conversion between utilities and probabilities (and ultimately, information) , which establishes a duality between the probability-and utility-representation of a decisionmaker. We show that the link between these representations can be characterized by a variational principle, which allows interpreting the probability measure as the equilibrium distribution over a constraint landscape determined by the utility function. Based on this interpretation, we then formalize the problem of maximizing the expectation of a target utility function as a transformation of an initial probability measure (encoding the prior behavior of the decision-maker) into a final probability measure that considers both the deviation from the initial probability measure and the new constraint given by the target utility function. We show how this leads to a principled way to choose a probability measure that optimally trades off the benefits of maximizing the target utilities against the costs of transforming the probability measure. We apply this formalism to stochastic systems that process an input-output (I/O) stream in a sequential fashion and construct a generalized variational principle for this setup. Finally, we show how to apply this generalized principle to derive solutions to the problems of optimal control, adaptive estimation and adaptive control.
Conversion between probability and utility

Preliminaries and notation
We introduce the following notation. A set is denoted by a calligraphic letter like X and consists of elements or symbols. Strings are finite concatenations of symbols. The empty string is denoted by ǫ. X n denotes the set of strings of length n based on X . For substrings, the following shorthand notation is used: a string that runs from index i to k is written as x i:k := x i x i+1 . . . x k−1 x k . Similarly, x ≤i := x 1 x 2 . . . x i is a string starting from the first index. By convention, x i:j := ǫ if i > j. Logarithms are always taken with respect to base 2, thus log(2) = 1. The symbol P(X ) denotes the powerset of X , i.e. the set of all subsets of X .
To simplify the exposition, all probability spaces are assumed to be finite. Due to this, we clarify some terminology. A probability space is a triple (Ω, F, P) where Ω is the sample space, F := P(Ω) is the σ-algebra of events, and P is the probability measure over F. A sample or outcome is an element ω ∈ Ω. An event is a member of F and hence a finite set of outcomes. An atom is a singleton {ω} ∈ F. A random variable is a function X : Ω → X mapping each outcome ω into a symbol X(ω) from a finite alphabet X . The probability of the random variable X taking on the value x ∈ X is defined as P(x) := P(X = x) := P({ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) = x}).
Utility
Consider a stochastic system whose behavior is represented by a probability space (Ω, F, P). The probability measure P fully characterizes the generative law of the potential events that the system can obtain. Thus, if P(A) > P(B), then the propensity of A is higher than that of B. This difference in probability can be given a teleological interpretation: A is more probable than B because A is more desirable than B. For reasons that will become apparent, a measure that quantifies such differences in desirability is called a utility function. If there is such a measure, then it is reasonable to demand the following three properties:
i. Utilities should be mappings from conditional events into real numbers.
ii. Utilities should be additive up to an arbitrary translation constant 1 .
iii. A more probable event should have a higher utility than a less probable event.
The three properties can then be summarized as follows. Definition 1. Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space. A function U is a utility function for P iff it has the following three properties for all events A, B, C, D ∈ F and some constant β ∈ R:
iii.
Furthermore, we use the abbreviation U(A) := U(A|Ω) for "unconditional" events. From property (ii) it is seen that the translation U ′ (·) = U(·) − β leads to a strict additivity of U ′ :
1. That is, the utility of a joint event should be obtained by summing up the utilities of the sub-events (up to an arbitrary translation constant). The translation constant accounts for the fact that absolute values of utilities are not meaningful: only differences between utilities matter. For example, the "utility of drinking coffee and eating a croissant" should equal "the utility of drinking coffee" plus the "utility of having a croissant given the reward of drinking coffee" minus a translation constant.
The following theorem shows that these three properties enforce a strict mapping between probabilities and utilities.
Theorem 2. If f is such that U(A|B) = f (P(A|B)) for any probability space (Ω, F, P), then f is of the form
where α > 0 is arbitrary strictly positive constant and β is an arbitrary constant.
Proof. Let f be such that f (P(C|D)) = U(C|D) for all C, D ∈ F. Let A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ∈ F be a sequence of events such that P(A 1 ) = P(A i | j<i A j ) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Applying f yields the equivalence
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Using the previous properties, the product rule for probabilities and the additivity property for utilities, one can show
Since P(A 1 ) is arbitrary, this means that
for arbitrary p ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ N. The rest of the argument parallels Shannon's entropy theorem (Shannon, 1948) . Let p, q ∈ (0, 1] such that q < p. Choose an arbitrarily large m ∈ N and find an n ∈ N to satisfy q m ≤ p n < q m+1 . Taking the logarithm, and dividing by n log q one obtains
Similarly, using f (p n ) = n(f (p) − β) and the monotonicity of f , we have
Dividing the last set of inequalities by n(f (p) − β) yields
Combining the inequalities in (1) and (2), one gets
Since m, n can be chosen arbitrary large, this implies
in the limit n → ∞. Fixing q and rearranging terms gives the functional form
where α must be positive to satisfy the monotonicity property.
Thus, Theorem 2 establishes the relation
and in particular,
In general, if a probability measure P and a utility function U satisfy this relation, then we say that they are conjugate. Given that this transformation is a bijection, one has that
) . There are two important observations with respect to this particular functional form. First, note that h(A|B) := − log P(A|B) is just the Shannon information content of A given B. Therefore,
Second, this transformation implies that the probability measure P is the Gibbs measure with temperature α and energy levels e(ω) := −U({ω}), i.e. the measure given by
for all A ∈ F. In statistical mechanics, the Gibbs measure is the equilibrium distribution for a given energy landscape. For this reason, we call α > 0 the temperature. The definition of utility extends to random variables in the natural way. Thus, given a random variable X with values in X , the utility of x ∈ X is given by U(x) = α log P(x) + β.
Variational principle
The conversion between probability and utility established in Theorem 2 satisfies a variational principle.
Theorem 3. Let X be a random variable with values in X . Let P and U be a conjugate pair of probability measure and utility function over X. Define the free utility functional as
where Pr is an arbitrary probability measure over X. Then,
Proof. A similar proof to the present one is given in Keller (1998, Theorem 1.1.3) . Rewriting terms using the utility-probability conversion and applying Jensen's inequality yields
with equality iff
is constant, i.e. if Pr = P.
The free utility 2 is the expected utility of the system plus the uncertainty over the outcome. The variational principle tells us that the probability law P of the system is the one that maximizes the free utility for a given utility function U, since
Here the utility function U plays the role of a constraint landscape for the probability measure P. As the temperature α approaches zero, the probability measure P(x) approaches a delta function δ x * (x), where x * = arg max x U(x). Similarly, as α → ∞, P(x) → 1 |X | , i.e. the uniform distribution over X . Hence, the temperature α plays the role of the conversion factor between resources and utilities.
The variational principle allows conceptualizing transformations of stochastic systems ( Figure 1 ). Consider an initial system having probability measure P i and utility function U i . This system satisfies the equation
2. The functional F := −J is also known as the Helmholtz free energy in thermodynamics. F is a measure of the "useful" work obtainable from a closed thermodynamic system at a constant temperature and volume.
We add new constraints represented by the utility function U * . Then, the resulting utility function U f is given by the sum
and the resulting probability measure P f maximizes
The difference in free utility is
The difference in free utility has an interpretation that is crucial for the formalization of bounded rationality: it is the expected target utility U * (first term) penalized by the cost of transforming P i into P f (second term). Clearly, (3) is a functional to be maximized. Depending on the givens and the unknowns, this leads to different variational problems. We emphasize the two cases that are important for our exposition:
1. Control. If we fix the initial probability measure P i and the constraint utilities U * , then the final system P f optimizes the trade-off between utility and resource costs. That is,
The solution is given by
In particular, at very low temperature α ≈ 0, (3) becomes
and hence resource costs are ignored in the choice of P f , leading to P f ≈ δ x * (x), where x * = max x U * (x). Similarly, at a high temperature, the difference is
and hence only resource costs matter, leading to P f ≈ P i .
Estimation.
If we fix the final probability measure P f and the constraint utilities U * , then the initial system P i satisfies
= arg min
and thus we have recovered the minimum relative entropy principle for estimation, having the solution
Varying the initial distribution P i is equivalent to varying the utility U i as part of U f such that the given distribution P f becomes the equilibrium distribution.
Alternatively, one can regard control as the problem of finding P f given U * and U i ; and estimation as the problem of finding U i given P f and U * . This is easily seen after rewriting the terms in (3).
I/O systems
We now turn our discussion to I/O systems. Informally, I/O systems model anything that has an I/O stream, like a calculator, a human cell, an animal, a computer program or a robot. In this sense, an I/O system is not required to be a discretely identifiable (physical) entity as long as there is a viewpoint from which it appears to have an I/O stream. For example, from a robot's perspective, its environment is a well-defined system too because it has an "input channel" to absorb the robot's actions and an "output channel" to produce the robot's perceptions. The mathematical description of an I/O system can be done at several levels. This paper focusses on two of them: behavior and beliefs. A model of behavior is a direct specification of an I/O system that merely describes the statistics of the I/O stream. A model of beliefs is an indirect specification of an I/O system that has the advantage of representing the I/O system's underlying assumptions that give rise to its behavior.
Model of behavior
Formally, an I/O system is an abstract model of a (stochastic) machine that processes input symbols and generates output symbols. These symbols are exchanged with another (external) I/O system via an I/O channel (Figure 2) .
The interaction between two I/O systems proceeds in cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T following a predefined protocol. The protocol determines which system is responsible for each cycle. In cycle t, the responsible system generates a symbol x t conditioned on the past symbols x <t . Then the cycle t + 1 starts.
If one wants to characterize the way an I/O system behaves, it is necessary to specify the statistics governing its potential I/O stream. One can encapsulate all the details by providing the probability distribution over the potential I/O sequences.
Figure 2: Two I/O systems P and Q interacting with each other.
Definition 4. An I/O system is a probability measure P over T random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X T taking on values in finite alphabets X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X T .
Because the I/O system processes both input and output symbols, the probability measure P contains both evidential and generative probabilities. The evidential probabilities, called plausibilities, allow the I/O system to infer properties about its input stream; while the generative probabilities, called propensities, prescribe the law to generate its output stream. Hence, if x t is generated by an external I/O system, then P(x t |x <t ) is the plausibility of observing x t given the past I/O string x <t ; while if x t is generated by the I/O system P itself, then P(x t |x <t ) is the propensity of producing x t given the past I/O string x <t .
Model of beliefs
While the previous definition contains all the necessary details to describe the behavior of an I/O system, it falls short modeling the I/O system's underlying assumptions that bring about its behavior. Importantly, it is desirable to model the uncertainties two interacting I/O systems have about each other, because these uncertainties play a fundamental rôle in conceptualizing adaptive behavior. The aim of this section is to introduce a model for I/O systems that allows explicitly representing these uncertainties.
Causal Models
From the point of view of an I/O system P that is interacting with an I/O system Q, one needs to represent (a) the uncertainty P has about Q and (b) the uncertainty Q has about P. Following a Bayesian approach, both uncertainties are modeled by the introduction of hidden/undisclosed variables. More specifically, cases (a) and (b) can be modeled by undisclosed inputs and undisclosed outputs respectively, i.e. symbols that are generated but kept hidden from the other system 3 . The inclusion of undisclosed random variables requires extending the interaction model as follows.
3. Undisclosed inputs, commonly known as hypotheses or latent variables in Bayesian statistics, are at the heart of Bayesian inference (Jaynes and Bretthorst, 2003) . In game theory, undisclosed outputs determine the player types. Player types are the crucial component of a Bayesian game whose purpose is to model games with incomplete information (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1999) .
The interaction between two I/O systems proceeds in cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In each cycle, either one of the two systems generates a symbol x t conditioned on the previously observed symbols. The symbol x t might be either disclosed or undisclosed. A disclosed symbol is observed by both systems, while an undisclosed one is only observed by the system who generated it. After a symbol is generated, the I/O systems that have observed it update their belief states.
To illustrate how uncertainty is modeled, consider the familiar Bayesian estimator. Let D := D 1 × . . . × D N be a set of strings, where each D n , 1 ≤ n ≤ N , is a finite alphabet. A Bayesian estimator over D with hypotheses Θ is a probability measure P over Θ × D of the form
where: d ≤N is an observation string with d n ∈ D n for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N ; θ ∈ Θ is a hypothesis; P (d ≤N |θ) is the likelihood of d ≤N under the hypothesis θ; and P (θ) is the prior probability of the hypothesis θ. The Bayesian estimator is an adaptive predictor: it uses the symbols observed in the past to predict the next symbol. The predictive distribution over the n-th observation (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) conditioned on the past observations d <n is then given by
where P (d n |θ, d <n ) is the likelihood of d n under hypothesis θ given the past observations d <n and P (θ|d <n ) is the posterior probability of θ given the past observations d <n . Both of these quantities are obtained from P (θ, d ≤N ) by applying standard probability calculus. It is easy to see that this probabilistic model corresponds to an I/O system P over a sequence x ≤T where: T := N + 1; x 1 := θ is an undisclosed input drawn from X 1 := Θ; and x t := d t−1 (2 ≤ t ≤ T ) is a disclosed input drawn from X t := D t−1 . The probability measure P is constructed from P as
where one has to notice that P = P because θ is unobserved and thus cannot be used to condition , i.e.
Hence, this illustrates two facts. First, undisclosed inputs play the role of hypotheses. Second, the model P and the I/O system P are in general not the same. Extending this scheme to include outputs as well is not straightforward. If some of the d n are generated by the system itself, then (7) does not hold anymore, because outputs are syntactically different from inputs, requiring belief updates governed by causal constraints. Essentially, an input provides the system with information about the whole history of the stochastic process, while an output, by virtue of being generated by the system itself as a function of the past, provides the system only with information about the present and future of the stochastic process because the past cannot be changed. See for instance Shafer (1996) , Pearl (2000) , Spirtes and Scheines (2001) and Dawid (2010) for a more in-depth exposition of causality.
In order carry out the belief updates following outputs, it is necessary to know the causal probability model for P . The causal probability model consists of a set of conditional probability measures highlighting the functional dependencies amongst the random variables. This is reflected in the following definition.
output input disclosed undisclosed observable P Q P Q P Q P Q X X X X Figure 3 : The four types of random variables with respect to P . Solid arrows mean that the value of the random variable is disclosed, while dashed arrows mean that the value is undisclosed. The enclosed area contains the random variables that are observable by P .
Definition 5. A causal model of an I/O system is a set of T conditional probability measures P (X 1 ), P (X 2 |X 1 ), . . . , P (X T |X <T ) over typed random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X T taking on values in finite alphabets X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X T .
The causal model explains how the random variables functionally depend on each other. In particular, for all t ≥ 1, the value of X t is generated as a function of the values of X 1 , . . . , X t−1 . The probability measure P over all the random variables is obtained by the product rule:
For notational convenience, we will use the letter P as a shorthand for the whole causal model.
The type of a random variable specifies whether it an input or an output, and whether it is disclosed or undisclosed (Figure 3 ). Both distinctions give rise to 2 × 2 = 4 possible types. If a random variable X t is not an undisclosed input, then we say that it is observable. In this sense, being or not observable is not a type, but a property of the random variable. The operational significance of the type of random variables will become clear in the context of belief updates.
Belief updates
When an I/O system observes the value x t ∈ X t of a random variable X t , then its information state is updated. This update depends on whether X t is an input or an output. If X t is an input, then the update is logical. If X t is an output, then the update is causal. This difference is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Figure 4: A logical versus a causal update. The figure shows three causally ordered random variables X 1 , X 2 and X 3 (taking on binary values) and their probabilities (through the height of their boxes). Two updates are compared: the logical update X 2 = 1 and the causal update X 2 ← 1. These updates eliminate the incompatible probability mass (as shown in the first column after the update) and then normalize the remaining probability mass (second column after the update). Note that a logical update affects the probability mass of the whole history, eliminating the incompatible realizations; while a causal update affects only the probability mass of the present and the future.
A logical update models a measurement. As such, it provides information about the whole realization of the stochastic process. That is, learning the value of X t provides information about all {X s : t ≤ s ≤ T } through the dependencies established by the causal model for P . A logical update X t = x t changes all conditional probabilities as
where A and B are arbitrary events. The plausibility of observing a sequence x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t (in this order) is given by P (x 1 )P (x 2 |x 1 )P (x 3 |x 1 , x 2 ) · · · P (x t |x 1 , . . . , x t−1 ) = P (x ≤t ), where the last equality follows from basic probability calculus.
A causal update models a decision. As such, it only provides information about the future of the realization of the stochastic process, but not about its past. That is, learning the value of X t provides information about {X s : s ≥ t, s ∈ N} only. Furthermore, the random variable X t is rendered independent from its past, thereby reflecting the autonomy of the decision. A causal update X t ← x t changes all conditional probabilities as
where A and B are arbitrary events and where P ′ is the probability measure uniquely defined by the equations i.
ii.
When the random variable X t is clear from the context, we use the abbreviation
The propensity of generating a sequence x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t (in this order) is given by
where the equality is obtained by using the definition of causal updates and then applying basic probability calculus. When an I/O system does not observe the value x t ∈ X t of a random variable X t because it is an undisclosed input, then its information state is not updated. That is, an unobserved update X t = x t leaves all conditional probabilities unchanged, i.e.
where A and B are arbitrary events.
Deriving behavior from beliefs
As anticipated previously, a model P of an I/O system P gives rise to a probability measure characterizing an I/O system. The probability measure P is derived from the causal model P as follows:
Definition 6. Let P be a causal model of an I/O system. The associated I/O system P is the I/O system recursively defined as
where the auxiliary function obs(·) is given by
In this definition, obs(x ≤t ) selects the values that the I/O system has observed at time t + 1, flagging them as either causal or logical belief updates. By construction, P has the important property that for all x ≤t , P(x t |x <t ) = P (x t |obs(x <t )).
The variational principle in I/O systems
Let us assume that we are in possession of a reference I/O system P 0 (or its causal model P 0 ) encoding our current knowledge. The problem is that we wish to convert P 0 into an I/O system P maximizing a given target utility function U * . We assume further that P 0 , P and U * share their random variables including the causal order and types. As we have argued previously, any transformation of a probability measure incurs into costs. These costs can potentially be so high that they jeopardize the benefits of naïvely maximizing the expectation of U * . We therefore seek an optimality principle that allows finding a probability measure P that trades off the benefits against the costs of this transformation.
In accord with Section 2.3, we first not that the transformation of the reference I/O system P 0 into P due to the addition of constraints U * can be expressed as a change in free utility characterized by Equation (3). The free utility functional for a given conjugate pair (P, U) can be expressed as follows
In Section 2.3 we have also emphasized that there are two variational problems, namely the control and the estimation problem, that arise depending on the givens and the unknowns of the variation. Naturally, this distinction carries over in the case of probability distributions representing I/O systems.
Suppose for simplicity that T = 1. Thus, we have to find an I/O system P over a single random variable X := X 1 taking on values in X := X 1 . Again, we write down the difference in free utility, but identifying the givens with P 0 and the unknowns with Pr. This yields the following two problems.
1. Control. If we are searching for a probability law P that fulfills the constraints given by the maximization of U * and the minimization of the cost of the transformation P 0 → P, then we use Equation (4), i.e.
P = arg max
Pr x∈X
2. Estimation. If we are searching for the best estimation P of the probability law P 0 under the constraints U * , then we use Equation (5), i.e.
P = arg min
The same idea extends to the case where T ≥ 1, obtaining a functional for the difference in free utility that spans all the random variables. A simple way to do this is again by recursively defining two auxiliary probability measures G and R as
Then, it is straightforward to see that the difference in free utility is given by
Applications
In the following, we will illustrate applications of the variational principle for I/O systems in Equation (11) by deriving solutions to three problems: optimal control, adaptive estimation and adaptive control. Let A and O be two finite sets, the first being the set of actions and the second being the set of observations. Furthermore, let Θ be a finite set called the set of parameters. The set Z := A × O is called the set of interactions, and a pair (a, o) ∈ Z is an interaction. We will underline symbols to glue them together as in ao ≤t := a 1 o 1 . . . a t o t to abbreviate strings of interactions. Let P and Q be I/O systems. By convention, we will consider P the system to be designed and Q an external system to be interfaced. Accordingly, we call P the agent, and Q the environment.
Consider the following interaction protocol. Initially, Q chooses a parameter θ ∈ Θ unbeknownst to P. Then, the interaction proceeds in cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In cycle t, P randomly chooses a value a t for the random variable A t from the set of actions A conditioned on the past I/O symbols ao <t . Q responds by choosing a value o t for the random variable O t from the set of observations O conditioned on the past I/O symbols θao <t a t . Then the next cycle starts. This interaction protocol determines a probability law over the causally ordered random variables θ, A 1 , O 1 , . . . , A T , O T defined as follows:
Note that with respect to P, θ is a latent variable, A 1 , . . . , A T are outputs and O 1 , . . . , O T are observable inputs. Similarly for Q, θ, O 1 , . . . , O T are outputs, and A 1 , . . . , A T are observable inputs. This interaction protocol, as known by P, is summarized in Table 1 . The applications in the following use this protocol or a simplification of it. The standard interaction protocol as seen by the agent P.
Optimal control
In optimal control problems it is generally assumed that we are given a utility function U * and that the environment is fully known, i.e. P 0 (o t |âo <tât ) = Q(o t |ao <t a t ). The choice of the parameter θ can be omitted. The probability measures G and R are given by
Hence, the variational problem to find P is to maximize the functional
which results from replacing G and R into (11) and by applying the equalities Pr(a t |âo <t ) = Pr(a t |ao <t ), Pr(o t |âo <tât ) = Pr(o t |ao <t a t ),
which are easily derived using (8) repeatedly. The important observation is that (12) can be seen as a concise way of expressing a collection of independent variational problems, where this collection contains one variational problem for each random variable. In the variational problem for the observation probabilities we can disregard the constraint utilities and the resource cost of the action probabilities. The t-th summand of the total expected reward can then be written as
Since varying Pr(o t |ao <t a t ) does not influence the summands at times = t, the optimal solution to this minimum relative entropy problem is trivially obtained by P (o t |ao <t a t ) = Q(o t |ao <t a t ). The variational problem with respect to the action probabilities is a little bit more intricate, since varying the first action probability, for example, has an impact on all subsequent conditional action probabilities. The functional (12) can be expanded recursively, yielding
The innermost variational problem is of the form
As discussed previously, its solution is
where Z α (ao <T ) is the normalizing constant, also known as the partition function. Similarly, the action probabilities P (a t |ao <t ) can be obtained as
where Z α (ao ≤t ) are the normalizing constants obtained for the subsequent time step. This way the optimal action probabilities can be computed recursively. This result allows to recover the maximum expected utility solution, and more specifically, the dynamic programming solution. Identify the value function as V α (ao <t ) := log Z α (ao <t ), and the instantaneous rewards as r(a t |ao <t ) := U * (a t |ao <t ) and r(o t |ao <t a t ) := U * (o t |ao <t a t ). If one takes the limit α → 0, then P (a t |ao <t ) → δ a * (a t ), where
and where the value V 0 (ao <t ) turns out to be given by the recursive formula
Taking the limit α → ∞ puts all the emphasis of the variational problem on the resource costs. This case yields P (a t |ao <t ) = P 0 (a t |ao <t ) as expected.
Adaptive estimation
In an adaptive estimation problem one is confronted with an unknown symbol source P 0 (o t |θ, o <t ) = Q(o t |θ,ô <t ) indexed by θ ∈ Θ and chosen randomly as P 0 (θ) = Q(θ).
For this observation problem we can disregard the action variables and set U * = 0. The probability measures G and R are given by
Replacing these distributions into (11) yields
For the parameter θ, we see that
and that the t-th summand of the functional can then be written as
The solution to this variational problem is well-known in the literature (Haussler and Opper, 1997; Opper, 1998) and is solved by the predictive distribution
where the posterior P 0 (θ|o <t ) is computed according to Bayes' rule.
Adaptive control
In adaptive control problems the environment is not known a priori, but known to belong to a set of possible environments P 0 (o t |θ,âo <tât ) = Q(o t |θ, aô <t a t ) indexed by θ ∈ Θ and chosen randomly as P 0 (θ) := Q(θ). We have also seen that quantities that are estimated require the solution of a variational problem that is local in time-in contrast to quantities that are controlled, which require the solution of a variational problem that stretches over the whole future. Can we devise an adaptive controller that is based on pure estimation? If we also happen to know a set of controllers P 0 (a t |θ,âo <t ) for each of these environments (for instance, constructed previously by solving the individual optimal control problems), then a Bayesian rule for control can be devised-compare Ortega and Braun (2010) . Since in pure estimation problems constraint utilities do not matter, we impose U * = 0 for the sake of simplicity. The probability measures G and R are given by
Inserting them into (11) yields
Again, for the parameter θ, we see that
For the variational problem of the observation at time t we can again disregard the resource costs of the actions. Analogous to the solution for adaptive estimation, the variational problem is equivalent to
which is solved by the predictive distribution
For actions, the procedure is identical. Thus, the variational problem for the t-th action is given by
again solved by the predictive distribution
This result has been previously reported as the Bayesian control rule (Ortega and Braun, 2008; Braun and Ortega, 2010) . By sampling from the predictive distribution P (a t+1 |âo ≤t ) the agent can solve adaptive control problems, such as bandit problems, adaptive linear quadratic control problems and Markov decision problems with unknown transition matrices.
Discussion
In this study we have used causal models to construct probability distributions representing I/O systems. As I/O systems both process input symbols and generate output symbols, their characterization requires both evidential and generative probabilities. The evidential probabilities ("plausibilities" in the subjectivist sense of probability) allow the I/O system to infer properties about the input stream, while the generative probabilities ("propensities" in the frequentist sense) prescribe the law to generate its output stream. The importance of distinguishing between input and output, more commonly known as the difference between seeing and doing, and their impact on inference, lies at the heart of statistical causality (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes and Scheines, 2001 ). Based on the equivalence of information and utility, we have devised a variational principle to construct I/O systems. Structural similarities between utilities and information have been previously reported in the literature (Candeal et al., 2001 ). For the case of known environments, a duality between optimal control and estimation has been previously reported by Todorov (2008) , where an exponential transformation mediates between the cost-to-go function and a probability distribution that acts as a backwards filter. For the case of optimally learning systems in unknown environments, a duality between utility and information has been reported by Belavkin (2008) , considering the problem of optimal learning as a variational problem of expected utility maximization with dynamical information constraints. An information-theoretic approach to interactive learning based on principles from statistical physics has also been proposed by Still (2009) . The use of the Kullback-Leibler divergence to measure deviations from a reference distribution as a cost function for control has been previously proposed by Todorov (2006 Todorov ( , 2009 and by Kappen, Gomez, and Opper (2009) . In these studies, transition probabilities of Markov systems were manipulated directly and the cost measured as a probabilistic deviation with respect to the passive dynamics of the system. Adaptive controllers based on the minimum relative entropy principle have been previously reported in Ortega and Braun (2008) and in Braun and Ortega (2010) . The contribution of our study is to devise a single axiomatic framework that allows for the solution of both control and adaptation problems based on the equivalence of utility and information. This axiomatic framework leads to a single variational principle to solve both problems. The resulting controllers optimize a tradeoff between maximization of a target utility function and resource costs and can hence be interpreted as bounded-rational actors.
The idea of bounded rationality through the consideration of information costs has been first proposed by Simon (1982) . In game theory, information theory has been proposed to formalize bounded rational players whose degree of rationality is given by a temperature parameter trading off entropy and payoff (Wolpert, 2004) . The distinction between disclosed and undisclosed information has also been studied extensively in the literature on game theory regarding problems of incomplete or imperfect information (see Gibbons 1992, and Osborne and Rubinstein 1999) . Like these previous studies, our work has obvious connections to information theory (Shannon, 1948) , thermodynamics (see e.g. Callen 1985) and statistical inference (see e.g. the maximum entropy principles in Jaynes and Bretthorst 2003).
Conclusions
The main contribution of the current paper is to derive axiomatically a framework for bounded rationality. We propose to formalize agents as probability distributions over I/O streams. Based on the idea that a free system produces an outcome with higher probability if and only if it is more desirable, we postulate three simple axioms relating utilities and probabilities. We show that these axioms enforce a unique conversion law between utility and probability (and thereby, information). Moreover, we show that this relation can be characterized as a variational principle: given a utility function, its conjugate probability measure maximizes the free utility functional. We exhibit how constrained transformations of probability measures can be characterized as a change in free utility and use this to formulate a model of bounded rationality. Accordingly, one obtains a variational principle to choose a probability measure that trades off the maximization of a target utility function and the cost of the deviation from a reference distribution. We show that optimal control, adaptive estimation and adaptive control problems can be solved this way in a resource-efficient way. When resource costs are ignored, the MEU principle is recovered. Our formalization might thus provide a principled approach to bounded rationality that establishes a link to information theory.
